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I. INTRODUCTION
This article is about the scope of federal regulation of employee benefit
plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("ERISA").' ERISA establishes four levels of increasingly intense regulation
for different types of benefit programs. First, those fringe benefit
arrangements that do not satisfy the statutory definitions of an "employee
welfare benefit plan" or an "employee pension benefit plan" are excluded
from federal oversight, but may be subject to state or local regulation.2
Second, programs that meet the definition of a welfare plan are subject to
* Copyright © 1998, Peter J. Wiedenbeck. All rights reserved. This Article is part of a larger
study of ERISA that is being prepared for the Federal Judicial Center.
** Professor of Law, Washington University. B.Sc., University of Toronto, 1976; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1979.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994) and in scattered sections of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1994)).
2. ERISA §§ 3(l)-(3), 4(a), 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1)-(3), 1003(a), 1144(a) (1994).
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federal reporting and disclosure rules, federal fiduciary standards, and a
federal enforcement mechanism (applicable to both the statutory obligations
and the terms of the plan) that entirely supplants state law. Under this
approach, ERISA generally monitors only the implementation or conduct of
privately-constituted welfare plans, it does not control their content.4 Third,
defined contribution pension plans are subject to the same conduct controls
as welfare plans, and their content must also measure up to certain minimum
standards that, among other things, restrict the use of age and service
conditions on plan membership, 5 require employer-financed pension benefits
to "vest" or become non-forfeitable after a reasonable period of service,
6
provide a surviving or divorced spouse access to the pension,7 and preclude
alienation of the participant's interest.8 Fourth, defined benefit pension plans
are subject to all those requirements and more, including minimum rates of
benefit accrual,9 minimum funding standards,10 coverage under the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") termination insurance program,'
1
and restrictions on termination.12
This pattern of increasingly stringent oversight was adopted to
accomplish four goals. Controlling mismanagement and abuse of employee
benefit funds was a central objective-federal fiduciary standards were
enacted because prevailing state law was not up to the task. While drawing
on general principles of trust law, ERISA's fiduciary standards include two
fundamental departures from prevailing state law. First, the statutory
definition of fiduciary extends far beyond state law trustees and imposes
standards of competence and fair dealing on anyone who has or exercises any
discretionary authority in the administration of the plan or who is involved in
the management of its assets, and on investment advisors as well. 13 Second,
3. ERISA §§ 3(1), 101(a), 401(a), 502, 514(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), 1021(a), 1101(a), 1132,
1144(a) (1994).
4. In a departure from this traditional hands-off approach to welfare plan content, ERISA was
amended in 1996 to require that group health plans satisfy minimum standards relating to health
insurance portability and access. See ERISA §§ 701-34, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-91c (Supp. 1998).
5. ERISA § 202,29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
6. ERISA § 203,29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994).
7. ERISA §§ 205, 206(d)(3), 514(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1056(d)(3), 1144(b)(7) (1994),
8. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1994).
9. ERISA § 204,29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1994).
10. ERISA §§ 301-08,29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86 (1994).
11. ERISA §§ 4021(a), (b)(1), 4001-4402,29 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), (b)(1), 1301-1461 (1994).
12. ERISA §§ 4041-42,29 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42 (1994).
13. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994); see S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29 (1973),
reprinted in 1 SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974, at 587, 615 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (concluding
fiduciary responsibility provisions were necessary because "it is unclear whether the traditional law of
[VOL. 76:311
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ERISA voids any attempt to relax its stringent fiduciary obligations through
the inclusion of exculpatory clauses in the plan, even though such
indulgences are common and effective under state law. 14 Mismanagement
and abuse are also deterred by requiring disclosure of the principal terms of
the plan and its current financial status. Should deterrence fail, disclosure
allows participants and beneficiaries to monitor the plan's administration and
enforce their rights.
Disclosure also furthers the second central goal of ERISA, promoting
economic efficiency by facilitating improved career and financial planning.
5
Disclosure gives workers the information they need to make an informed
evaluation of competing job opportunities and to accommodate their personal
financial affairs to the employer's program (by allowing them to determine
their need for additional savings or insurance, for example).
In the case of pension plans ERISA goes beyond disclosure and the
trusts is applicable [to certain] plans, such as insured plans, that do not use the trust form as their mode
of funding."). While the extension of fiduciary obligations to insurance and annuity plans was
deliberate and well understood, including as fiduciaries all persons with any discretionary authority in
plan administration (in addition to those who have a role in the management or disposition of assets)
seems to have escaped congressional attention.
14. See ERISA § 410(a), 29 U.S&C. § 1110(a) (1994). The Senate report explained:
[R]eliance on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the interests of plan
participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law had developed in the context of
testamentary and inter vivos trusts ... with an attendant emphasis on carrying out the instructions
of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor includes in the trust document an exculpatory clause under which
the trustee is relieved from liability for certain actions which would otherwise constitute a breach
of duty, or if the settlor specifies that the trustee shall be allowed to make investments which
might otherwise be considered imprudent, the trust law in many states will be interpreted to allow
the deviation. In the absence of a fiduciary responsibility section in the present Act, courts
applying trust law to employee benefit plans have allowed the same kinds of deviations, even
though the typical employee benefit plan ... is quite different from the testamentary trust both in
purpose and nature.
S. REP. No. 93-127, at 29 (1973), reprinted in 1 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 587,
615.
15. ERISA requires that participants and beneficiaries be supplied with a summary plan
description, ERISA § 101(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1021(a)(1) (1994), which "shall be written in a manner
calculated to be understood by the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations
under the plan." ERISA § 102(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994). This summary plan description
(SPD) was made the participants' principal source of information on plan content because:
It is grossly unfair to hold an employee accountable for acts which disqualify him from benefits, if
he had no knowledge of these acts, or if these conditions were stated in a misleading or
incomprehensible manner in plan booklets. Subcommittee findings were abundant in establishing
that an average plan participant, even where he has been furnished an explanation of his plans
provisions, often cannot comprehend them because of the technicalities and complexities of the
language used.
S. RatP. NO. 93-127, at 11 (1973), reprinted in 1 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 587,
597.
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regulation of fiduciary conduct to impose minimum standards on certain plan
terms, thereby accomplishing the third statutory objective: assuring that the
promise of a pension has some minimum content. Such content regulation is
generally considered patemalistic-it is assumed that the justification for
restricting freedom of contract under a regime of full disclosure lies in a
concern that many participants would not make proper use of the information
available to them. 16 But minimum standards of pension plan content can also
be viewed as an attempt to promote better decisionmaking by standardizing
certain key contract terms in order to avoid information overload.
17
Thus, controlling mismanagement and abuse of benefit programs,
increasing economic efficiency through improved career and financial
planning, and protecting workers with pension quality standards are the chief
purposes of federal benefit regulation. But these purposes are subject to an
important qualification. Congress sought to accomplish these objectives
without fundamentally altering the nature of employee benefit programs-
the system was to remain private, voluntary, and employment-based. 18
16. Underestimation of the risk of pension loss due to factors such as forfeiture conditions,
underfunding, fiduciary misconduct, or employer insolvency would cause workers to overvalue
unregulated pension promises. Consistent overvaluation would permit employers to charge more for
pension plan coverage, via reduced wages or other benefits, than such contingent retirement savings
are really worth. Under such conditions, substantive regulation to reduce the risk of pension loss might
bring the real worth of plan coverage into line with workers' inflated estimation, increasing their
welfare. From this standpoint, ERISA's pension plan content controls can be viewed as an instance of
consumer protection legislation-disclosure being ineffective in this area, protection took the form of
minimum standards of product quality. See infra note 70.
17.
For most workers, the cost of evaluating the specialized terms and particular finances of numerous
alternative plans (associated with different employment opportunities) may exceed the benefit of a
marginally more valuable pension. Information costs may be reduced by limited standardization
(i.e., restricting the variance) of key contract terms. By reducing job search costs, such content
regulation may increase economic efficiency.
From the information cost perspective, pension content controls complement the disclosure
regime. Disclosure provides access to information, while content controls limit the volume of
information to a manageable level. Together, they facilitate career and financial planning.
Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans", 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 574
(1994). ERISA also standardizes all implied terms of both pension and welfare plans by imposing
uniform fiduciary obligations and authorizing the development of a federal common law of benefit
plans to replace preempted state law. See id. at 576.
18. Senator Jacob K. Javits, the foremost legislative proponent of comprehensive federal pension
regulation explained:
The problem, as perceived by those who were with me on this issue in the Congress, was how
to maintain the voluntary growth of private plans while at the same time making needed structural
reforms in such areas as vesting, funding, termination, etc., so as to safeguard workers against loss
of their earned or anticipated benefits-which was their principal cause of complaint and which,
over the years, had led to widespread frustration and bitterness. [The] new law represents an
overall effort to strike a balance between the clearly-demonstrated needs of workers for greater




Consequently, employers will decline to sponsor plans if costs become too
high. By virtue of this opt-out, the regulation of employee benefits entails a
delicate balance-measures intended to improve the quality of health
insurance or retirement programs, if taken too far, deter some employers
from providing such benefits at all. Because the availability of benefits
depends on employer decisionmaking, ERISA necessarily incorporates a
fourth, and competing, objective: cost containment and the preservation of
employer flexibility.
This article examines the fit between these policy goals and existing
interpretations of ERISA's reach. It shows that although the statute's anti-
abuse and protective policies have been influential in defining the scope and
extent of benefit plan regulation, neither is pursued with single-minded
consistency. In the main, this inconsistency is traceable to historical
circumstance rather than reasoned compromise between competing
objectives.
II. DISCUSSION
Congress relied on the Commerce Clause as the basis for its power to
regulate employee benefit plans. ERISA applies to any "employee benefit
plan" established or maintained by an employer "engaged in commerce or in
any industry or activity affecting commerce," as well as to plans established
or maintained by unions representing employees so engaged. 19 The statute
broadly defines "commerce" and "industry or activity affecting commerce"
to reach most any employer or union, regardless of size.20
dictated structure that would discourage voluntary initiatives for further expansion and
improvement.
Senator Jacob K Javits, Address at the Briefing Conference on Pension and Employee Benefits (Sept.
19, 1974), quoted in Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF
1974: THE FIRST DECADE 25 (Comm. Print 1984).
19. ERISA § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1994).
20. See ERISA § 3(11), (12), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(11), (12) (1994); Fugarino v. Hartford Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding group health insurance provided by small
family-owned restaurant was subject to ERISA, notwithstanding the business' trivial impact on
commerce).
ERISA's definitions of "commerce" and "industry or activity affecting commerce" were carried
over verbatim from a predecessor statute, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub.
L. No. 85-836, § 3(10), (11), 72 Stat. 997, as amended by Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76 Stat. 35, repealed by
ERISA § 11 l(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1031(a)(1) (1994) [hereinafter WPPDA]. That definition was in turn
taken from the jurisdictional provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 142(1) (1994). See 104
CONG. REC. 16,437-38 (1958) (remarks of Reps. Barden, Frelinghuysen, and Green) (discussing the
prudence of using the language of the Taft-Hartley Act, § 142(1), in the WPPDA). Under Taft-Hartley
it is sufficient if the industry as a whole affects commerce; it is not necessary that the particular
1998]
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Enterprise size does not seriously restrict ERISA's scope, but federal
controls come into play only if there is an "employee benefit plan." The
definition of employee benefit plan imposes three important limitations on
ERISA's coverage. First, the arrangement for the provision of benefits must
constitute a "plan, fund or program." Second, the plan must provide benefits
to employees or their beneficiaries. Third, the benefits provided must be of a
type specified in either the definition of a "welfare plan" or a "pension
plan."21 Each of these criteria implicates fundamental interpretive and policy
issues that are examined below. The discussion concludes with an
exploration of legislative exceptions that render certain employee benefit
plans largely or completely exempt from federal regulation.
A. The "Plan" Prerequisite
An arrangement for the provision of benefits must be a "plan, fund, or
program" to be subject to ERISA.22 The statute offers no definition of these
terms. Judicial efforts to supply a definition have encountered three sorts of
issues. First, the decisions reveal that the presence of either an ongoing
administrative program for processing claims and paying benefits, or some
person having the status of a fiduciary, is necessary to support the finding of
a plan. Second, certain arrangements to provide benefits may be too
indefinite to create a plan. Third, where a benefit is provided to a very small
number of employees, it is often asserted that coverage is too restricted to
constitute a plan.
1. Ongoing Administration or Fiduciary Status23
Where an employee benefit can be provided without establishing an
ongoing administrative apparatus there is no "plan," provided that the
obligation is unfunded and nondiscretionary. This conclusion follows from a
line of cases tracing back to Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne.24 There, the
Supreme Court held that a Maine law requiring one-time severance payments
in the event of a plant closing was not preempted by ERISA because it
enterprise in which the employer or unionized employees are engaged affects commerce. E.g., United
States v. Ricciardi, 357 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1966) (saying the relevant industry "comprises all
business activities in the same field").
21. ERISA § 3(3), (1), (2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3), (1), (2)(A) (1994).
22. ERISA §§ 4(a), 3(3), (I), (2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1002(3), (I), (2)(A) (1994).
23. Part of the following discussion is derived from Wiedenbeck, supra note 17, at 586-89, 591-
93.
24. 482 U.S. 1(1987).
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"neither establishes, nor requires an employer to maintain, an employee
welfare benefit 'plan."' 25 The Court distinguished its earlier summary
affirmance of decisions holding an unfunded severance program subject to
ERISA because the program in those cases created an ongoing commitment
to pay benefits as each person left employment and so required a continuing
administrative scheme. 6 Equating an ERISA plan with an "ongoing
administrative program for processing claims and paying benefits '27 was
supported by the policy of preemption: conforming a benefit program to a
patchwork of state regulation would forfeit the advantages of uniform
administrative practice, whereas a contingent one-time obligation to make
nondiscretionary lump-sum payments entails no such inefficiency.28 The
Court also observed that the Maine plant-closing law "not only fails to
implicate the concerns of ERISA's pre-emption provision, it fails to
implicate the regulatory concerns of ERISA itself."29 Looking to the
legislative history of ERISA's fiduciary responsibility rules (which apply to
both pension and welfare plans), the Court concluded that "[t]he focus of the
statute thus is on the administrative integrity of benefit plans-which
presumes that some type of administrative activity is taking place." 30
Lower court decisions involving employer-initiated severance programs
25. Id. at 6.
26. See id. at 17-19 (distinguishing Holland v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 772 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir.
1985), summarily afjrd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986), and Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 765 F.2d 320 (2d
Cir. 1985), summarily affd, 477 U.S. 901 (1986)).
27. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 12.
28. See id. at 8-15. The Fort Halifax majority observed that "Congress intended pre-emption to
afford employers the advantages of a uniform set of administrative procedures governed by a single set
of regulations." Id. at 1. Yet employers could secure the cost advantages of a single set of
administrative procedures by including a choice of law provision in their benefit plans. This
consideration suggests that it is workers who benefit through lower information costs from having all
plans subject to the same set of supplementary rules.
The Court in Fort Halifax relied on precedent to support its conclusion that preemption serves the
employer's cost interest in uniformity, see id. at 10-13, but the cases relied upon involved state-
mandated benefits rather than differing administrative procedures. Cf Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan,
Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted a New Jersey statute that prohibitted
offsetting workers' compensation payments against pension benefits); Standard Oil Co. v. Agsalud,
633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), summarily aftd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981) (holding that ERISA preempted a
Hawaii law mandating employer provision of specified health insurance benefits). In the context of
mandated benefits, unlike administrative procedures, the employer does have a cost-based interest in
preemption. In a dissenting opinion Justice White, joined by three other members of the Court,
observed that Agsalud "involved more than administrative uniformity," and contended that the Maine
plant-closing statute, which also involved mandated benefits, should be preempted. See Fort Halifax,
482 U.S. at 24-26. This suggests that the majority's incomplete analysis of the policy of preemption
(i.e., overlooking the employees' interest in uniformity and the employer's interest in laissez-faire)
may have led the Court to adopt an unduly narrow approach to preemption.
29. Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 15.
30. Id.
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have fleshed out the scope of Fort Halifax. Arrangements to make a readily-
determinable lump-sum cash payment have been found not to constitute an
ERISA plan.31 Yet some short-term commitments calling for payment in a
lump sum have been subjected to federal regulation, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's search for an ongoing administrative program. Comparison
of the decisions demonstrates that if there is no continuing administrative
apparatus, then ERISA's application turns on the presence or absence of
discretion in processing benefit claims.
Many of the leading cases involve unfunded executive severance ("golden
parachute") programs. In Fontenot v. NL Industries, Inc.32 the employer
adopted, as one component of a takeover defense, a plan providing that
selected senior executives would receive a lump-sum cash severance
payment in an amount equal to three times the highest annual compensation
received in the preceding three years if employment was terminated for any
reason within two years of a change in control of the corporation.33 The
plaintiff, who was not included in the program, was terminated one year after
a takeover. He sued for benefits under federal law, but the employer was
granted summary judgment on the ground that ERISA did not apply.
34
In contrast, ERISA has been applied to other golden parachute programs.
It may seem startling that a labor law enacted to protect workers' interests
sometimes extends to managers' efforts to protect themselves in the event of
a change in corporate control. But if the severance allowance entails a
discretionary determination (as to eligibility or amount), safeguards are
needed to prevent abuse. Cases such as Bogue v. Ampex Corp.35 vividly
illustrate the breadth of the statute. There a program covering ten executives
of a subsidiary that was to be sold called for severance payments if an
executive was not offered "substantially similar employment" within 10
months after the sale. The Ninth Circuit stated:
31. See Angst v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 969 F.2d 1530 (3d Cir. 1992); Fontenot v. NL Indus., Inc.,
953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992); Wells v. General Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989).
32. 953 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1992).
33. See id. at 961, 963.
34. Id. at 961.
35. 976 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit has subsequently limited Bogue by holding
that an individually-negotiated executive employment contract that called for readily-determinable
severance payments in the event of termination "without cause" did not establish an ERISA plan. See
Delaye v. Agripac, Inc., 39 F.3d 235 (9th Cir. 1994). According to the court, this single discretionary
determination-unlike the 10 decisions possible in Bogue-did not require "ongoing discretionary
analysis." Id at 238. The analysis in Delaye conflates the search for continuing (nondiscretionary)
administrative activity with the search for discretionary decisionmaking. ERISA's policies of
preventing employer abuse and protecting participants indicate that a single judgment call should




In this case, Allied-Signal, the program's administrator, remained
obligated to decide whether a complaining employee's job was
"substantially equivalent" to his pre-acquisition job. Although the
program, like the plans in Fort Halifax and Wells, was triggered by a
single event, that event would occur more than once, at a different
time for each employee. There was no way to carry out that obligation
with the unthinking, one-time, nondiscretionary application of the plan
administrators [as] in Fort Halifax and Wells. Although its application
was uncertain, its term was short, and the number of its participants
was small, the program's administration required a case-by-case,
discretionary application of its terms. Whether or not Allied-Signal
ever thought [that the program would be subject to ERISA] does not
matter.... We hold that Allied-Signal was obligated to apply enough
ongoing, particularized, administrative, discretionary analysis to make
the program in this case a "plan."
36
Similarly, the Third Circuit held that a plan that required a separate
determination of each covered executive's eligibility for benefits
(specifically, whether post-merger termination was for reasons other than
cause) was an ERISA plan.37
This focus on administrative discretion seems sensible in light of the Fort
Halifax policy analysis: if preventing mismanagement and abuse by
fiduciaries is the central tenet of ERISA, perhaps ERISA should not apply
where there are no judgment calls to oversee. Two elements of ERISA
support such a conclusion. First, ERISA's fiduciary duty and prohibited
transactions rules apply only to fiduciaries, 8 whom the statute broadly
defines as any person who has or exercises "any discretionary authority" in
the management or administration of the plan.39 Second, this approach is
consistent with the limited abuse-of-discretion standard of review that is
applied to benefit claim denials where the plan gives the fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the
36. Bogue, 976 F.2d at 1323. Accord Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72, 76
(2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 511 (1996); Cvelbar v. CBI Illinois, Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1376
(7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 56 (1997).
37. See Pane v. RCA Corp., 667 F. Supp. 168, 170-71 (D.N.J. 1987), affd, 868 F.2d 631 (3d Cir.
1989). See also Kulinski v. Medtronic Bio-Medicus, Inc., 21 F.3d 254, 258 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding an
agreement calling for severance pay in the event of resignation for good reason within one year of a
hostile takeover did not create an ERISA plan because it gave the employee unfettered discretion to
decide whether he had good reason to resign; the court noted that a plan exists where the employer
"must analyze each employee's particular circumstances in light of the appropriate criteria" to
determine benefit eligibility or amount).
38. ERISA §§ 404(a), 406,29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1106(1994).
39. ERISA § 3(21)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1994).
1998]
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terms of the plan.4°
The presence of a discretionary determination should not be the exclusive
trigger of ERISA, however. Preventing mismanagement and abuse by
fiduciaries is a central tenet of ERISA, but mishandling of plan assets is as
much a threat to the integrity of benefit plans as abusive decisionmaking is.
ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions were intended to prohibit
outright thievery and looting of benefit funds by anyone with access to the
fund, however exalted or subordinate her position. Accordingly, oversight of
discretionary decisionmaking alone is not enough to protect workers'
interests. ERISA should apply either if the benefit obligation involves the
exercise of discretion or if it is advance-funded. ERISA's drafters understood
this point-if the plan is funded, any person who "exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets" is a fiduciary,
whether or not that authority involves the exercise of discretion.41 Plan
trustees are always fiduciaries, as are other people who handle plan assets,
even if their duties are purely ministerial (an agent of the trustee, for
example).42 Yet the protection Congress intended to afford in the definition
of fiduciary is illusory if the statute fails to apply for want of a plan. To
safeguard workers from both oppressive decisions and looting of the fund,
the core jurisdictional principle should be: where there is a fiduciary, there is
a plan.
Fort Halifax supports an even more wide-ranging definition of plan, one
that would consider the presence of ongoing administrative activity as well as
the presence of a fiduciary. Although the severance payments required by the
Maine plant-closing statute in Fort Halifax were unfunded and
nondiscretionary (the employer's obligation could be discharged without the
service of an ERISA fiduciary), the Court's opinion indicates that ERISA
would apply if there were "an ongoing administrative program for processing
claims and paying benefits. ' 43 Apparently, then, a regular or continuing
benefit obligation would trigger ERISA even if that obligation is unfunded
40. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
41. See ERISA § 3(21)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (1994).
42. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (D-2) (1997) (stating that persons who perform various functions
"within a framework of policies, interpretations, rules, practices and procedures made by other
persons" are not fiduciaries, but of the listed "ministerial functions" only one-"collection of contribu-
tions and application of contributions as provided in the plan"--involves handling assets); see also
Anoka Orthopaedic Assocs., P.A. v. Mutschler, 709 F. Supp. 1475, 1482-83 (D. Minn. 1989), af/'d,
910 F.2d. 514 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the attorney and the accountant who prepared year-end
financial statements, conducted limited audits, and provided other services that did not involve
investment or handling of plan assets were not fiduciaries).




and nondiscretionary.44 This connotation of "plan" may take into account the
view that, although "ERISA's central focus [is on] administrative integrity,"
fiduciary responsibility is not the only component of federal benefit plan
regulation. In particular, workers must be informed of the extent of the
benefit obligation (coverage, amount and timing) and the method for
"processing claims and paying benefits" in order to take full advantage of the
program.45 Ongoing administration by itself implicates informational
interests, and so it should trigger ERISA's reporting and disclosure regime.46
This judicially-developed definition of plan (requiring either ongoing
administration or the presence of a fiduciary) is rightly informed by the goals
of ERISA. It also has some textual support. Recall that ERISA defines both a
welfare plan and a pension plan as a "plan,firnd, or program."47 Use of the
term "fund" indicates that ERISA applies whenever the obligation is
advance-funded. Funding, of course, requires continuing oversight and
assures that there will be someone with fiduciary status. "Program" implies
an ordered sequences of events (such as a procedure for processing claims
and paying benefits), which lends credence to the distinction between
ongoing administration and a one-time lump-sum payment.
2. Indefiniteness
To be subject to federal regulation a welfare or pension plan must be
"established or maintained by an employer or by an employee
organization."48 That is, the plan must already have come into existence. A
tentative or projected benefit arrangement is not a plan, or (equivalently) has
not been "established. ' 49
44. See id. at 18 nf. 10 & 12 (distinguishing a benefit obligation that entails "regularity of
payment").
45. See ERISA §§ 101(a)(1), 102, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021(a)(1), 1022 (1994) (summary plan
description requirement and contents).
46. In discussing why the Maine plant-closing statute "fails to implicate the regulatory concerns
of ERISA itself," Fort Halifax, 482 U.S. at 15, the Court considered both fiduciary responsibility and
reporting and disclosure. The opinion observes that there was no "administrative activity potentially
subject to employer abuse" and that "[n]o financial transactions take place that would be listed in an
annual report, and no further information regarding the terms of the severance pay obligation is needed
because the statute itself makes these terms clear." Id. at 16.
47. ERISA §§ 3(1), (2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(1), (2) (1994) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. See Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855, 862 (4th Cir. 1994) (ruling an employer's
preliminary statements of its intentions concerning the terms of a new ESOP do not constitute an
enforceable plan); James v. National Bus. Sys., Inc., 924 F.2d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)
(stating that for ERISA to come into play the plan must be "intended to be in effect, and not just be
something for future adoption," and that documents describing a plan as being tentative, contingent, or
infuturo should be considered as evidence that no plan was in effect).
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Donovan v. Dillingham is the leading authority on the proof required to
demonstrate that a plan has been established.5' The case involved the
purchase of health insurance by small employers through a group insurance
trust in order to obtain more favorable rates. The Secretary of Labor argued
that even if the purchase of health insurance was not itself sufficient to
trigger ERISA, the separate determination of each employer to provide
benefits to its employees by subscribing to the group trust established a
plan.52 The Eleventh Circuit held that a plan is not "established" merely by
virtue of a decision to provide benefits of a type specified in ERISA; rather,
the program must have become a reality.5 3 A decision implemented by the
purchase of insurance, however, creates a plan.54 Employers who purchased
insurance through the group trust were found to have established ERISA
welfare plans if the insurance was obtained to fulfill a collective bargaining
agreement or under circumstances indicating an intent to provide continuing
coverage of a class of employees.5 5 More generally, the court observed that
"[i]n determining whether a plan, fund, or program (pursuant to a writing or
not) is a reality a court must determine whether from the surrounding
circumstances a reasonable person could ascertain the intended benefits,
beneficiaries, source of financing, and procedures for receiving benefits,"
recognizing that some of these essential criteria can be incorporated from
sources outside the plan, such as an insurance claims procedure.
As the Dillingham definition suggests, no particular formality is required
to show the existence of a plan. Most importantly, compliance with ERISA is
not essential. (If compliance were a condition of plan classification, then
ERISA's standards, which were intended to be mandatory, would be made
elective.)57 Oral arrangements also can be plans even though ERISA requires
50. 688 F.2d 1367 (I1th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
51. "Every circuit that has since been required to decide whether, on the particular facts before it,
a pension plan has come into being has adopted the Dillingham approach." Kenney v. Roland Parson
Contracting Corp., 28 F.3d 1254, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Ginsburg, J.) (citing authorities).
52. See 668 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11 th Cir. 1982) (opinion before rehearing en banc).
53. Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1373.
54. See id. at 1375.
55. Id. at 1374-75.
56. Id. at 1373.
57. See id. at 1372 (saying "it would be incongruous for persons establishing or maintaining
informal or unwritten employee benefit plans, or assuming the responsibility of safeguarding plan
assets, to circumvent the Act merely because an administrator or other fiduciary failed to satisfy
reporting or fiduciary standards"); Phillips v. Brandess Home Builders, Inc., No. 95-C-204, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14496, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 2, 1995) ("The applicability of ERISA standards cannot turn
on an employer's compliance with them."); Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 826
(N.D. I11. 993) ("If an employer could avoid ERISA coverage of its benefit plan simply by violating
ERISA's requirements and then claiming that the plan did not function the way ERISA plans typically




almost all welfare and pension plans to be in writing.5 8 Similarly,
unpublicized (secret) benefit programs can trigger the statute, bringing its
fundamental tenet of employee disclosure into play.59 Moreover, if the
intended benefits and beneficiaries are clear but the employer is silent
regarding funding or claims procedures, some decisions have found a plan
based on the inference that benefits are to be paid out of the employer's
general funds or that application for benefits should be made to the
company's personnel department.0°
Can an informal policy of providing a benefit in individually-determined
amounts to selected employees be a plan? Arguably the intended benefits and
beneficiaries of such a policy are unascertainable. When faced with evidence
that a large employer maintained a longstanding system of ad hoc,
individualized grants of severance benefits, the Third Circuit held that "the
discretionary nature of benefits... does not alone deprive a document or
program of its status as an employee benefit plan under the Dillingham
standard, so long as a reasonable person can ascertain the contingent benefit
and contingent beneficiaries."6' The discretionary nature of the benefit would
not prevent a disappointed employee from obtaining review of the denial of
the benefit, but that review would be limited to the deferential abuse of
discretion standard.6 2 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit has refused to apply
ERISA to an accounting firm's informal pension arrangement, where only
three of twenty-five retirees received benefits and the amount was
determined ad hoc rather than according to an established formula.6 3 The
court observed that "[w]ith only this evidence, we could not begin to fashion
appropriate relief for [plaintiff], since we do not know whether he was the
type of employee [the firm] intended to cover, or what benefits are due."64
Similarly, a chief executive officer's practice of occasionally granting
severance pay in amounts determined by the application of largely undefined
benefit plans-would be defeated.") (citations omitted).
58. E.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372; Scott v. Gulf Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (9th Cir
1985).
59. See, e.g., Brown v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp., 876 F.2d 546, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1989)
(confidential memorandum to management created severance pay plan); Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748
F.2d 1348, 1356 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985) (same, and refusing to interpret
secret plan with reference to the employer's secret intentions or past course of conduct).
60. See, e.g., Deibler v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 F.2d 206,
210 (3d Cir. 1992); Dwyer v. Galen Hosp. Ill., Inc., No.94-C-544, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921, at
*26-27 (N.D. I11. Mar. 11, 1996).
61. Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d
391,401 (3d Cir. 1992).
62. Id.
63. See Diak v. Dwyer, Costell & Knox, P.C., 33 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 813.
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criteria was found by a district court to be too unsystematic and indefinite to
constitute a plan.
65
The principle that discretionary authority brings ERISA's fiduciary
standards into play to safeguard employees66 clashes with these cases holding
that too much discretion negates the existence of a plan by making the
intended benefits or beneficiaries unascertainable. If standards or guidelines
for the exercise of discretion can be gleaned from the employer's
representations, past practice or surrounding circumstances, then the courts
have a basis to review benefit determinations to prevent employer abuse, and
the policy of ERISA demands that they do so.
But what if there are no standards, so that discretion is unbounded and
benefits are awarded by a series of individualized ad hoc determinations?
When discretion becomes prerogative, is there any role for a reviewing court
to play? Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act there is no
jurisdiction to review bureaucratic action where the decision is "committed
by law to agency discretion."67 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
exception to the general rule of reviewability narrowly, holding that judicial
review is precluded only where there is "no law to apply. '68 That is,
preclusion applies only where there is no basis for a court to police the
exercise of discretion because there is no indication of any standards or
guidelines that the agency must use in making the decision. A similar futility
concern seems to be at play in cases holding that too much discretion negates
the existence of a plan by making the intended benefits or beneficiaries
unascertainable. But such ready acceptance of the administrative law analogy
may be inappropriate in the ERISA context. ERISA requires that every
employee benefit plan "specify the basis on which payments are made to and
from the plan." 69 "Plan" is a broader category than "fund," and this rule
applies to nearly all plans, including unfunded welfare plans. Where there is
no fund, specifying "the basis on which payments are made ... from the
plan" necessarily requires that the plan either expressly define its intended
beneficiaries and benefits (either by specification, class description or
formula), or set forth meaningful guidelines to inform the fiduciary's
exercise of discretion.
65. See Spanos v. Continental PubI. Servs., Inc., No. C-93-1624 MHP, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6695, at *7-11 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 1994).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 31-40.
67. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1994).
68. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See generally Ronald
M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewabilit, in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990).
69. ERISA § 402(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(4) (1994).
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Should a benefit arrangement that does not comply with this aspect of
ERISA be exempt from ERISA, any more than (for instance) a program that
violates the writing requirement? Because ERISA was designed to protect
employees' reasonable expectations, 70 the answer should depend upon the
information available to employees.71 If the employer's acts or omissions
created a reasonable expectation that benefits might be awarded, a plan
should be held to exist, but covering only that group of employees for whom• • 72
such a reasonable expectation could arise. For example, ad hoc grants of
severance or pension benefits that are unknown to the continuing workforce
should not trigger ERISA. On the other hand, if workers become aware
(whether by employer information or recurrent practice) that such benefits
are granted to selected managerial employees, a plan covering management
should be found to exist. Where no employer policy or past practice provides
guidelines for selecting among contingent beneficiaries (management
employees in this example) or setting benefit levels, a reviewing court should
use reasonable expectations as a guide, resolving all doubts against the
employer, whose unlawful conduct created the uncertainty.73 This approach
would distinguish Henglein, in which a plan was held to exist where the
employer was aware that salaried employees believed there was an ongoing
70. "[ERISA] was, at its core, a 'reasonable expectations' bill. It gave an ordinary employee the
assured right to receive what a reasonable person in his boots would have expected in the
circumstances. Primarily, it was a consumer protection bill." Frank Cummings, ERISA: The
Reasonable Expectations Bill, 65 TAX NOTES 880, 881 (1994). ERISA's findings confirm that a major
impetus for the legislation was the concern that many workers were "losing anticipated retirement
benefits" due to the lack of vesting provisions and the termination of underfunded plans. See ERISA §
2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1994).
71. This recommendation may seem inconsistent with decisions that hold unpublicized benefit
programs to be plans subject to ERISA. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Those cases,
however, addressed situations where there was no uncertainty as to the employer's undertaking. Due to
the secrecy there was no need to protect reliance (i.e., ERISA's protective policy was not implicated),
but the statute's informational and anti-abuse objectives still loomed large. In the case of an
unpublicized indefinite program, there is no reliance, nor is there much to be gained by way of worker
career and financial planning or monitoring program administration.
72. Belanger v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 71 F.3d 451 (1st Cir. 1995), held that severance pay granted
under a series of four time-limited early retirement offers made within four years did not create an
ongoing severance pay plan because each offer involved only an unfunded nondiscretionary one-time
payment that was independent on its face, and the company never represented that there was any
linkage or continuing commitment. See id. at 456. The court observed that in determining the existence
of a plan "[o]ne very important consideration is whether, in light of all the surrounding facts and
circumstances, a reasonable employee would perceive an ongoing commitment by the employer to
provide employee benefits." Id. at 455.
73. If the court errs, the employer can respond by terminating the program. In the case of a
welfare plan, termination can eliminate employer liability, except with respect to those participants
who have previously satisfied all conditions for receipt of the benefit. In the case of a pension plan,
termination prevents further benefit accrual, but it cannot eliminate participants' rights to benefits
earned by prior service. ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (1994).
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discretionary severance program but the employer made no effort to dispel
that impression,74 from Diak, in which the court held there was no plan, and
where there was no evidence that the claimant was aware of ad hoc unfunded
pension payments to three retirees.7
3. Restricted Coverage
7 6
Restricted coverage constitutes the third ground on which the existence of
a plan is frequently challenged. Where a benefit is provided to one or a very
small number of employees the arrangement may be intended only as a
"special deal" contained in individual employment contracts, and not part of
a general program. But does the meaning of "plan" necessarily entail a
general program? Attention to ERISA's policies strongly suggests that the
answer should be no.
Preliminarily, it should be noted that the statutory text offers scant
guidance. The welfare and pension plan definitions refer in the plural to
"participants" and "employees."" On the other hand, in common usage the
term "plan" normally conveys a sense of prearrangement or design, not
generality.
78
Legislative history suggests that a benefit arrangement covering one or a
few employees can be a plan. ERISA's reporting and disclosure rules and its
definitions of welfare and pension plans are drawn from the Welfare and
74. See Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d
391, 396, 400-02 (3d Cir. 1992) (describing relevant evidence of the existence of a plan, including the
employer's oral representations, "a deliberate failure to correct known perceptions of a plan's
existence, [and] the reasonable understanding of employees").
75. See Diak v. Dwyer, Costello, & Knox, P.C., 33 F.3d 809, 811, 813 (7th Cir. 1994) (observing
that there was no evidence that claimant expected a pension; he was told that the firm had no pension
plan and that payments to a retiree were compensation for services). In the author's opinion, the Diak
court reached the right result, but the decision should have been based on the lack of employee
reliance rather than the difficulty in ascertaining the intended benefits or beneficiaries. Further, in
Gilmore v. Silgan Plastics Corp., 917 F.Supp. 685 (E.D. Mo. 1996), an announced company policy of
granting severance benefits to employees approved by the plant manager was held not to create a plan,
even though the manager's discretionary decision was shown to have been based on production needs.
Under the analysis suggested in the text the Gilmore facts are enough to constitute a plan. Had ERISA
been applied the plaintiffs should nevertheless have been denied relief because they were not
challenging any discretionary (i.e., fiduciary) decision. Instead, they had been denied benefits pursuant
to company announcements (informal plan amendments) that clearly limited program eligibility to
employees in other job classifications.
76. Parts of the following discussion are derived from Wiedenbeck, supra note 17, at 576-85.
77. See ERISA § 3(l), (2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (2)(A) (1994). But see I U.S.C. § 1 (1994)
("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise ... words
importing the plural include the singular").
78. See, e.g., RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1014 (rev. ed. 1975); AMERICAN
HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1045 (3d ed. 1993); WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 1372 (2d ed. rev. 1983).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss1/21
ERISA'S CURIOUS COVERAGE
Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 ("WPPDA").7 9 The WPPDA
exempted plans covering twenty-five or fewer participants from disclosure
obligations.80 ERISA did not carry forward any such small plan exemption.
8 1
The alterations made to the predecessor definitions of welfare and pension
plans are also telling. The WPPDA required that the plan be "communicated
or its benefits described in writing to the employees. 82 This writing
requirement was designed to "eliminate informal or personal arrangements
from the scope of the [WPPDA]," because "[i]ndividual arrangements with
executives for benefits are not contemplated as being covered by the
[WPPDAI."8 3 Under ERISA certain executive compensation arrangements
are excluded in a more targeted fashion, as described below.84 And while
ERISA requires nearly all plans to be "established and maintained pursuant
to a written instrument,"85 the writing requirement is now a consequence of
plan classification, not a predicate of it.
8 6
A regulation in effect since 1975 indicates that a single-employee
arrangement can be a plan subject to ERISA,87 and several courts agree.88
Other cases hold that restricted coverage bars ERISA's application, but many
of them can be traced to some early ill-considered Labor Department
advisory opinions that announced (without support) that an individual
employment contract is not subject to ERISA 8 9-a position the Department
has since recanted. 9° These restrictive holdings may also proceed from the
79. See WPPDA, supra note 20.
80. Id. §4(bX4).
81. Early versions of pension reform legislation did exempt plans covering not more than twenty-
five employees. E.g., Retirement Income Security for Employees Act, S. 4, § 104(b)(4) (1973),
reprinted in 1 ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 117; S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 18-19
(1973) (stating small plans exempted to avoid inhibiting growth of pension coverage), reprinted in 1
ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 604-05.
82. WPPDA, supra note 20, § 3(a)(1), (2).
83. S. REP. NO. 85-1440, at 25-26 (1958), reprinted in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WELFARE AND PENSION PLANS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1958 at 206
(1962) [hereinafter WPPDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; see also H.R. REP. No. 85-2283, at 11 (1958),
reprinted in WPPDA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 207.
84. See infra text accompanying notes 91, 149-6 1.
85. ERISA §§ 401(a), 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1102(a)(1) (1994).
86. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
87. 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-3(b) (1997) ("[A] Keogh plan under which one or more common law
employees, in addition to the self-employed individuals, are participants covered under the plan, will
be covered under title I.").
88. See, e.g., Cvelbar v. CBI Ill., Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1376 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
CL 56 (1997); Biggers v. Wittek, 4 F.3d 291, 298 (4th Cir. 1993); Williams v. Wright, 927 F.2d 1540,
1545 (11th Cir. 1991); Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 827 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
89. See, e.g., Lackey v. Whitehall Corp., 704 F. Supp. 201 (D. Kan. 1988); Jervis v. Elerding,
504 F. Supp. 606, 607-08 (C.D. Cal. 1980); O'Halloren v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Union, 730 P.2d
616 (Or. Ct. App. 1986).
90. See, e.g., Letter from Robert J. Doyle, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Regulations and
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assumption that Congress could not have intended to work such a sweeping
transformation of employment relations, for if applied to individualized
benefit commitments, ERISA might seem to swallow up the common law of
employment contracts. But this concern is misplaced, because ERISA only
reaches post-employment compensation (i.e., pensions) and enumerated
welfare benefits, not all terms and conditions of employment.
The objection that ERISA's protective policy is unnecessary when a
benefit arrangement is specially designed (perhaps even separately
bargained-for) to meet the needs of one or a few employees is more weighty.
In those circumstances, it can be assumed that participation is fully informed
and deliberate, and key personnel typically have the education, judgment,
and bargaining power necessary to protect themselves. Because such special
arrangements grow out of competition for highly-skilled labor, the firm's
interest is aligned with the participant's, which minimizes the risk of
employer abuse.
But restricted coverage by itself does not assure that the program is
designed and administered to meet the needs of participants. Consider a
financially strapped small firm that promises a pension to one or a few rank-
and-file employees in lieu of paying higher wages. The business may fail
while the benefit is unfunded, but the participants are not in a position to
gauge that risk. As this example illustrates, the identity of the promisees is a
better indicator of the need for regulation than mere breadth of coverage. In
fact, ERISA excepts unfunded deferred compensation plans for "a select
group of management or highly compensated employees" from its fiduciary
oversight and pension content controls. 9' This targeted exclusion of certain
executive compensation arrangements strongly confirms that an individual
employment contract or small plan exception was not intended and is not
necessary.
Interpretations, Department of Labor, to Joel P. Bennett (Oct. 19, 1985), available in 1985 ERISA
LEXIS 63 (saying ERISA coverage is "not affected by the fact that the arrangement is limited to
covering a single employee, is negotiated between the employer and the employee, or is not intended
by the employer-plan sponsor to be an employee benefit plan for purposes of [ERISA]");.ERISA Op.
Ltr. 91-20A (July 2, 1991), available in 1991 ERISA LEXIS 29.
91. ERISA § 201(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (1994) (participation, benefit accrual, vesting, spousal
rights and anti-alienation); ERISA § 301(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1081(a)(3) (1994) (finding); ERISA
§ 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(1) (1994) (fiduciary responsibility); ERISA § 4021(b)(6), 29 U.S.C.







ERISA applies only to plans that provide welfare or pension benefits to
"employees," 92 but the statute defines employee circularly, as "any individual
employed by an employer., 93 In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Darden,94 the Supreme Court construed the term to incorporate the
traditional test of employee status under the general common law of agency:
"In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the
general common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to
control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished.
Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required;
the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring
party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work;
the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying
assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party."
95
Conceding that the common law offers "no paradigm of determinacy," 96 the
Court explained that .'all of the incidents of the relationship must be
assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive."' 97 The Court
rejected the argument that ERISA's broad remedial purposes support a more
expansive reading of the term, in part because the purposive approach would
engender even greater uncertainty.98
The burgeoning of the contingent workforce and the rise of
92. A pension plan is defined as a program that provides retirement income to employees or
results in a deferral of income by employees until the termination of employment or later. See ERISA
§ 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2XA) (1994). In contrast, the welfare plan definition requires the
provision of an enumerated benefit to "participants or their beneficiaries," but the term participant
means any "employee or former employee ... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit"
under the plan, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible. ERISA § 3(1), (7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (7)
(1994).
93. ERISA § 3(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (1994).
94. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
95. Id. at 323-34 (quoting from Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730,
751-52 (1989)).
96. Darden, 503 U.S. at 327.
97. Id. at 324 (quoting from NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)).
98. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 326-27.
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telecommuting have made worker classification (employee versus
independent contractor) increasingly important and contentious for
employment tax purposes-fees paid to independent contractors are not
subject to income tax withholding, social security taxes or the federal
unemployment tax. Where a plan provides that it covers some or all
categories of "employees" (meaning common law employees), or expressly
excludes independent contractors, errors in worker classification can also
cause wrongfiul denial of benefits. 99 But if the plan so provides, employees
may be excluded from coverage based on their mode of payment, job type,
work location, or other reason. 00 Consequently workers who are found to
have been mistakenly treated as independent contractors are not
automatically entitled to participate in employee benefit plans: worker
classification is relevant to membership only if the plan makes it so.
2. Business Owners
The ERISA status of business owners continues to be problematic. Labor
Department regulations provide that a benefit program that covers only
individuals who own, or whose spouses own, an interest in an unincorporated
business (as partner or proprietor) is not a "plan" subject to federal
regulation, but ERISA does apply if one or more common law employees is
a participant. 10' To avoid distortions in the choice of business form, if a
corporation is wholly owned by an individual (or by an individual and his or
her spouse), a benefit program that does not cover any other employee is also
exempt from ERISA.10 2 These limitations can make federal benefit
protections turn on the sometimes difficult distinction between a common
law employee and a service partner.
Recently, an appellate court held that a nominal partner in one of the
world's largest accounting firms was more properly classified as an
99. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that unless
excluded by another provision, an ERISA plan that by its terms applies to "common law employees"
must cover a large staff of "freelance" software developers that the company erroneously treated as
independent contractors for employment tax purposes, despite the fact that freelancers were hired
under the understanding that they were not eligible for benefits), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 899 (1998).
100. The only eligibility conditions outlawed by ERISA are certain age and service conditions in
the case of pension plans and specified health status factors in the case of group health plans. See
ERISA § 202,29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994); ERISA § 1182,29 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (Supp. 1988).
101. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(b), (c) (1997). To trigger ERISA the program must cover a common
law employee who is not an owner's spouse.
102. See id. This rule applies even if the shareholder or spouse is also a common law employee of
the corporation. It does not extend to cases where the corporation is closely held but not wholly owned
by an individual or a married couple. Accordingly, the incorporation of a sole proprietorship does not
affect ERISA's coverage, but the incorporation of a partnership usually does.
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employee for purposes of ERISA, and therefore entitled to statutory
protection against discharge intended to prevent pension vesting.10 3 While
recognizing that the partner-employee distinction is governed by common
law principles codified in the Uniform Partnership Act, the court's analysis
was heavily influenced by the traditional test of employee status under the
general common law of agency (as enunciated in Darden), with particular
emphasis on the plaintiff's inability to participate in the management and
control of the business. 104 The case presents an extreme example of a partner
being frozen-out by a self-perpetuating management committee.105 Yet the
decision is startling because the federal income tax also relies on common
law principles codified in the Uniform Partnership Act and reaches the
opposite result: members of the largest accounting and law firms are taxed as
partners regardless of the internal governance structure of the firm.0 6
ERISA applies if a benefit plan covers at least one common law
employee along with business owners. But in that situation, do ERISA's
protections extend to the owners? Only the regulation that defines the term
employee benefit plan expressly excludes sole shareholders, sole proprietors,
partners, and their spouses from the definition of employee. 107 Yet if there is
a plan, ERISA grants rights and remedies to "participants" and their
beneficiaries,'0 8 and the statute defines "participant" as an "employee or
former employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible to
receive a benefit" under the plan. 109 Reliance on the traditional common law
understanding of the employment relation seems to compel the conclusion
103. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1862
(1997).
104. Simpson, 100 F.3dat 443.
105. The district court opinion states this in its fuller recitation of facts. See Simpson v. Ernest &
Young, 850 F. Supp. 648, 650-53 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
106. Although Simpson is admittedly a close case, in the author's opinion it was wrongly decided.
The decision ignores the fact that partners may by agreement be completely excluded from
management councils, downplays the probative value of loss sharing, and overlooks differences
between a partner's and an employee's apparent authority to bind the firm when dealing with
outsiders. See Uniform Partnership Act § 6(1) (1914) (partnership definition); id. § 7(4) (profit-sharing
prima facie evidence of partnership); id. § 9(1) (apparent authority of partner); id. § 16(2) (effect of
consent to representation as partner); id. § 18(e) (partner's management rights subject to modification
by agreement).
107. See 29 C.FR. § 2510.3-3(c) (1997) (exclusion from employee status "for purposes of this
section"); Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 11 F.3d 444, 449-50 (4th Cir. 1993);
Preamble, 40 Fed. Reg. 34,526, 34,528 (Aug. 15, 1975) (indicating the regulatory exclusion of sole
shareholders, sole proprietors, partners, and spouses from the category of employees was deliberately
restricted to the determination whether an employee benefit plan exists, and was not intended to
govern interpretation of the term "participant").
108. E.g., ERISA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1994) (disclosure); ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1) (1994) (fiduciary duties); ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994) (civil enforcement).
109. ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1994).
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that partners and proprietors cannot be participants and so cannot qualify for
ERISA's protections, even if they are covered under a plan that includes
common law employees. Accordingly, their rights and obligations would be
defined and enforced by state, not federal, law.
In Fugarino v. Hartford Life and Accident Insurance Co., 0 the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the statute prescribes this result, that owner-
participants do not have rights under ERISA. In Fugurino, the claims of a
sole proprietor and his dependents under a group health insurance policy
were judged under state law, while common law employees' rights were
governed by ERISA.'1 ' Under such an approach the inclusion of a common
law employee in a program established primarily for the benefit of the
business owner does not expand or contract the owner's rights. But in
Madonia v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Virginia,1 2 the Fourth Circuit held
that the claims of a sole shareholder and his dependents under a group health
insurance policy are governed by ERISA, not state law, where corporate
employees in addition to the shareholder were participants. Madonia
expressly relied on the fact that under the separate entity principle of
corporate law the shareholder was also a common law employee of his
corporation. In his employee capacity the shareholder satisfied the definition
of a participant as construed by the Supreme Court in Darden, while the plan
was subject to ERISA because it covered employees in addition to the
shareholder." 3 Fugarino is distinguishable because at common law an owner
of an unincorporated business (sole proprietor or partner) cannot have the
dual status of an employee, even if she provides services to the firm.
It seems strangely inefficient to have different bodies of law apply to
employees and owners who work side by side in an unincorporated business
and participate in the same benefit program. But although a single document
sets forth the terms of the program, a careful reading of ERISA confirms that
the "plan" subject to federal regulation is only that portion of the overall
undertaking that serves common-law employees. The statutory definition
provides that a welfare plan exists only "to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing
[designated benefits] for its participants or their beneficiaries," and
110. 969 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 966 (1993).
111. Id. at 185-87.
112. 11F.3d444(4thCir. 1993).
113. Id. at 448-50. Similar reasoning would indicate that, even though the rights of the partner or
proprietor are given by state law, the spouse of a partner or proprietor would be protected by ERISA if
that spouse was a participant employed in the business and the plan was subject to ERISA (i.e., some




"participant" is defined with reference to employee status. 114 Similarly, a
pension plan exists only "to the extent that by its express terms or as a result
of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program-(i) provides
retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by
employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment
or beyond."'"15 Because the portion of a benefit arrangement that covers non-
employees is not a plan, ERISA's preemption of "any and all State laws
insofar as they ... relate to any employee benefit plan" does not apply: those
non-employee participants are left to the care of state law.1 6 At a policy level
this limitation at least has the virtue noted earlier, that the benefit rights of the
owner(s) of an unincorporated business are not altered by the inclusion of a
common law employee in the program, even though federal law safeguards
the employee's interest.' 1
7
C. The Dubious Pension-Welfare Dichotomy
ERISA applies only to an "employee benefit plan," defined as either an
employee welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan."8
Consequently, in addition to requiring a "plan" in which at least one
"employee" participates, federal regulation comes into play only if the
arrangement provides either welfare or pension benefits. A program that
provides retirement income or systematically defers compensation until
termination of covered employment or beyond qualifies as a pension plan."
9
A program that provides any of certain specifically-listed benefits is a welfare
plan, whether the benefit is provided on a current or deferred basis.
1 20
Welfare benefits may be provided in kind, but far more commonly they take
the form of cash payments or reimbursements of the cost of designated
expenses (e.g., medical care). Any non-pension employee benefit that is not
enumerated in the definition of welfare plan is wholly exempt from federal
regulation. This part will briefly examine some curious features of this
statutory benefit taxonomy, beginning with pension benefits.
114. ERISA § 3(1), (7), 29 U.S.C. § I002(1), (7) (1994) (emphasis added).
115. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
116. ERISA § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
117. As the discussion of Madonia indicates, see supra text accompaning notes 112-13, if all of
the stock of a corporation is owned by an individual (or by an individual and his or her spouse) the
participation of some other employee may cause the stockholder's or spouse's rights to be determined
under federal rather than state law.
118. ERISA §§ 4(a), 3(3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(a), 1002(3) (1994).
119. ERISA § 3(2XA), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994).
120. ERISA § 3(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
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1. Pension Benefits
Pension plans are subject to the most intense federal regulation because of
the long-term nature of the benefit obligation and the resulting potential for
changed circumstances and defeated expectations. Because the employee's
circumstances may change, ERISA requires that pension benefits become
nonforfeitable (vest) upon the completion of no more than seven years of
service, and normally provides survivor annuity protection to the
participant's spouse. To protect against employer default, systematic
advance funding is required of defined benefit plans and their benefits are
insured by the PBGC.122 Although deferral creates the risks to which these
rules respond, the statutory definition of a pension plan is not simply keyed
to the duration of the commitment To be a pension plan the program must
"provide retirement income to employees, or result[] in a deferral of income
by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered
employment or beyond."' 3 Consequently, deferral of compensation, even for
an extended period, does not create a pension plan (absent special
circumstances) if the deferred amounts are payable during the continuance of
the employment relation.1 24 Indeed, such in-service deferred compensation
arrangements do not even meet the definition of a welfare plan, and therefore
are also exempt from federal disclosure and fiduciary obligations.1
25
121. See ERISA §§ 203(a)(2), 205,29 U.S.C. §§ 1053(a)(2), 1055 (1994).
122. See ERISA §§ 301-08, 4021-22,29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86, 1321-22 (1994)
123. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994). ERISA is not a tax statute, and so the
definitional references to "retirement income" and "deferral of income" should not be construed as
conditioning pension plan classification on the time at which compensation is includible in gross
income. Funded nonqualified deferred compensation is taxable upon the elimination of any substantial
risk of forfeiture, .RLC. §§ 83(a), 402(b) (1994), which may occur well in advance of retirement or
separation from service, yet such plans were clearly intended to be subject to ERISA, see, e.g., ERISA
§ 201(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (1994) (indicating only certain unfunded executive deferred
compensation plans are subject to relaxed regulation). Hence the references to "income" in the pension
plan definition should be interpreted according to the timing of the distribution of deferred
compensation; in accordance, that is, with the common understanding that the term income has
reference to receipt.
124. A Labor Department regulation provides that the term "pension plan" does not include
"payments made by an employer to some or all of its employees as bonuses for work performed,
unless such payments are systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or
beyond, or so as to provide retirement income to employees." 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) (1997).
125. In-service deferred compensation may present a lower risk of abuse because the goodwill of
current employees and the employer's reputation in the labor market are at stake, making the contract
largely self-enforcing. A failing or downsizing firm, in contrast, may not be dissuaded by such
concerns from taking advantage of departing workers. This is an example of the "last period problem,"
that market discipline becomes unreliable when one party expects to withdraw from continuing
commercial intercourse, a situation which economists recognize as appropriate for legal intervention.
See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMic STRUCTURE OF




Annuity distribution is not required for a plan to "provide[] retirement
income." A lump-sum payment can be used for support in retirement, and a
plan that provides retirement income is a pension plan regardless of "the
method of distributing benefits from the plan."
126
The other prong of the statutory definition is even more expansive, for a
plan that defers income only to the "termination of covered employment'--
that is, until separation from service-is a pension plan, although departing
employees may be years away from retirement, in the sense of permanent
withdrawal from the labor force. Moreover, a plan that does not "by its
express terms" provide retirement income or defer compensation until
separation from service is nevertheless a pension plan if it provides such
payments "as a result of surrounding circumstances." Under this rule a
deferred compensation arrangement can be a pension plan if distributions are
skewed toward the last years of participants' careers, 127 and even relatively
short-term deferral can trigger pension classification if the program's
coverage is tilted in favor of older workers nearing retirement. 128 Absent such
surrounding circumstances, the mere fact that a fixed-term deferred
compensation agreement calls for earlier payment in the event of death,
disability or other termination of employment does not turn it into a pension
plan because termination-based distributions are incidental, rather than being
the focus of the program.
29
62 (1984); WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA 228-30 (1993).
126. ERISA § 3(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (1994) (final clause); ERISA Op. Ltr. 75-12 (July
17, 1975), available in 1975 ERISA LEXIS 55 (stating that a profit-sharing plan calling for lump-sum
distribution on termination of employment is a pension plan under ERISA). A pair of Fourth Circuit
decisions can be read as finding long-term payout important to pension classification, but the opinions
are poorly reasoned and the suggestion is misguided, as fully explained in Wiedenbeck, supra note 17,
580-81 and nn.108-12.
127. See ERISA Op. Ltr. 83-46A (Sept. 8, 1983), available in 1983 ERISA LEXIS 14 (advising
that late-career distributions and long payout schedule are factors to be considered in determining
whether a deferred compensation arrangement is a pension plan as a result of surrounding
circumstances).
128. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 89-07A (Apr. 17, 1989), available in 1989 ERISA LEXIS I (ruling a
bonus program under which the employee must continue to be employed for five years to receive
payment is not a pension plan unless the selection of bonus recipients is skewed toward employees
nearing retirement); ERISA Op. Ltr. 81-16A (Jan. 23, 1981), available in 1981 ERISA LEXIS 75
(saying a 10-year payout could make oil and gas royalty fund a pension plan, depending on the
likelihood that employees permitted to participate will retire or separate from service within that
period).
129. Hagel v. United Land Co., 759 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding a bonus that
provided for payment in five equal annual installments or earlier in the event of death, permanent
disability or change in control of employer was not a pension plan because ERISA requires that a plan
"generally defer the receipt of income to the termination of employment," a requirement not satisfied
where "under the facts of a particular case, a portion of the withheld income happens to become due
after termination"); ERISA Op. Ltr. 83-46A (Sept. 8, 1983), available in 1983 ERISA LEXIS 14
(saying the "mere fact that a plan provides that payments which would otherwise be made on a
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If a participant is given the option between taking payment of deferred
compensation after a specified period of time and allowing the amount to
remain on deposit for distribution (with earnings) upon separation from
service, is it a pension plan? Provided that early payment is not penalized nor
delayed distribution subsidized (by the tax law or the employer) so as to bias
the participant's choice, the program would not cause compensation to be
systematically deferred until the termination of employment, and is exempt
from ERISA.130 If, however, the employer administers the program in a way
that discourages participants from taking early payment, then it is a pension
plan as a result of surrounding circumstances. These circumstances may
include the employer's communications (or lack thereof) concerning the
program, such as the failure to publicize the early withdrawal option.
131
Severance pay plans present a unique classification challenge under
ERISA. Severance pay is, by definition, compensation deferred until the
termination of employment. Thus it would automatically fall into the pension
category but for a special dispensation. That dispensation takes the form of
statutory authorization for the Secretary of Labor to write regulations treating
some or all severance pay arrangements as welfare plans rather than pension
plans.132 Pursuant to that authority, a regulation has been promulgated which
states that a severance program will not be treated as a pension plan if
severance payments not exceeding twice the employee's annual
pretermination compensation are completed within two years, and the
specified date may be paid earlier in the event an employee terminates employment does not
automatically mean that the arrangement is a pension plan by its express terms," but such accelerated
payment is a factor to be considered in conjunction with surrounding circumstances); see Murphy v.
Inexco Oil Co., 611 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(c) (1997) (stating a bonus program does not constitute a pension
plan unless "payments are systematically deferred to the termination of covered employment or
beyond, or so as to provide retirement income to employees"); McKinsey v. Sentry Ins., 986 F.2d 401,
406 (10th Cir. 1993).
131. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 81-18A (Feb. 2, 1981), available in 1981 ERISA LEXIS 73 (advising
that an employee stock purchase plan under which participants had the right to sell their stock but were
not always given share certificates could be a pension plan if it is administered or communicated in a
way that discourages participants from receiving or selling the stock); ERISA Op. Ltr. 90-17A (June
25, 1990), available in 1990 ERISA LEXIS 27 (saying an employee stock purchase plan could be
pension plan if communications to participants suggest that it is intended to provide retirement income
or defer income until separation from service); ERISA Op. Ltr. 83-46A (Sept. 8, 1983), available in
1983 ERISA LEXIS 14 (same).
132. ERISA § 3(2)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(B3) (1994). Severance pay is also a welfare benefit by
virtue of the cross reference in ERISA's definition of a welfare plan to benefits described in § 302(c)
of the Labor Management Relations Act. See ERISA § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-1(a)(2) (1997). But recall that ad hoe separation payments to selected employees may be so





payments are not conditioned, directly or indirectly, on retirement. 133 The
Labor Department has taken the position that severance pay may be
indirectly conditioned on retirement and so subject to stringent pension plan
regulation if the program is limited to employees with many years of service
(a group for whom termination of employment is likely to mean withdrawal
from the labor force, i.e., retirement) or is conditioned on taking distribution
from the company's retirement plan.
134
2. Welfare Benefits
Welfare plans are subject to reporting and disclosure requirements,
fiduciary responsibility standards, and a federal enforcement mechanism that
includes broad preemption of state law. To be classified as a welfare plan the
program must provide one or more statutorily enumerated benefits, namely:
(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care benefits, or benefits in the event
of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care
centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or 03) any benefit
described in section 302(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
1947 (other than pensions on retirement or death, and insurance to
provide such pensions).13
5
In general, ERISA applies without regard to whether benefits are financed by
the purchase of insurance (group-term life insurance is commonly used to
provide employee death benefits, for example) or are paid out of the general
assets of the employer (i.e., self-insurance). While a welfare plan may
provide benefits of more than one type, a benefit that is not described in
ERISA does not become subject to federal regulation merely because it is
included with pension or welfare benefits in a multi-benefit plan.136 Federal
preemption does not apply, and employees' rights in such non-ERISA
benefits are determined by state courts under state law.
133. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b) (1997).
134. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 84-15A (Mar. 20, 1984), available in 1984 ERISA LEXIS 32
(severance arrangement limited to employees with 18 or more years of service); ERISA Op. Ltr. 83-
47A (Sept. 13, 1983), available in 1983 ERISA LEXIS 13 (severance pay conditioned on employee
taking lump sum distribution from defined benefit pension plan).
135. ERISA § 3(I), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
136. ERISA § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994), provides that a benefit program is a welfare plan
only "to the extent that" it provides one of the statutorily-listed benefits. Accord, Kemp v. IBM Corp.,
109 F.3d 708, 713 (11th Cir. 1997).
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The benefit types included in the welfare plan definition seem haphazard
and unsystematic. In fact, the statute reflects the scope of two earlier pieces
of federal legislation. ERISA's reporting and disclosure regime is traceable
to the WPPDA. The WPPDA also provided the starting point for ERISA's
definition of a welfare plan, but it reached only "medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability,
death or unemployment." 137 Presumably, this definition responded to the
perceived prevalence of various sorts of employee benefit programs at the
time of its enactment.
ERISA expanded upon the WPPDA's definition by directly listing most
of the benefits then described in paragraphs (6) through (8) of section 302(c)
of the Labor Management Relations Act (the Taft-Harley Act), while
incorporating the rest by reference.138 In 1974, when ERISA was enacted, the
cross reference to section 302(c) reached only severance and holiday
benefits,' 39 but a 1990 amendment of the Taft-Hartley Act has brought
"financial assistance for employee housing" within the ambit of ERISA
welfare plan regulation. 1
40
ERISA's reliance on the Taft-Hartley Act's list of benefits apparently
stems from the fact that notorious abuses in the management of employee
benefit funds created the impetus for ERISA's fiduciary standards, and those
abuses involved trusts to provide benefits to unionized employees under the
Taft-Hartley Act.' 4' That act makes it a crime for an employer to contribute
137. WPPDA, supra note 20, § 3(a)(1).
138. Compare ERISA § 3(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994), with 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6)-(8) (1994).
Paragraph (6) describes "pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits [and the] costs of
apprenticeship or other training programs," 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(6) (1994); paragraph (7) includes
"scholarships for the benefit of employees, their families, and dependents for study at educational
institutions [and] child care centers for preschool and school age dependents of employees," id.
§ 186(c)(7); paragraph (8) covers "a trust fund established ... for the purpose of defraying the costs of
legal services for employees, their families, and dependents," id. § 186(c)(8).
139. See 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(a)(3) (1997) (regulation adopted in 1975 observes that the Taft-
Hartley Act cross reference expands ERISA's statutory list of welfare benefits only by adding holiday,
severance and similar benefits). As noted earlier, severance programs can also be classified as pension
plans because benefits are deferred until "the termination of covered employment." ERISA
§ 3(2)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Nevertheless, most severance pay plans are subject
only to welfare plan requirements because the Labor Department has exercised its authority to exempt
designated severance pay plans from pension controls by regulation. See ERISA § 3(2)(B), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2)(B) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-2(b) (1997). Under that regulation, if severance benefits do
not exceed two years' pay and are fully distributed within two years pension plan treatment can be
avoided, and almost all severance programs are written to conform to those conditions.
140. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(7)(C) (1994) (including housing assistance on the Taft-Hartley list).
141. Federal fiduciary standards were an early, noncontroversial component of legislative
proposals for benefit plan regulation. That consensus grew out of spectacular revelations in the mid-
1960s of the diversion of more than $4 million from the welfare funds of two small local unions to the




to a trust for unionized employees if the trust provides any type of benefit not
specifically permitted by section 301(c), so the Taft-Hartley Act's list of
permissible benefits may have been assumed to cover the field of lawful
employee benefits. Unfortunately, there are two defects in this analysis. First,
other types of benefits may be provided to unionized employees if they are
not funded through a trust, and ERISA was intended to apply regardless of
funding.142 (Even if there is no pot of money to steal, ERISA makes a
fiduciary's discretionary decisions subject to oversight.) Second, employers
may unilaterally establish benefit plans (funded or unfunded) for their
nonunionized workers, and these programs are not constrained by the Taft-
Hartley Act's list of permissible benefits. Accordingly, if ERISA's definition
of a welfare plan was intended to cover the universe of non-pension
benefits--or even if it was meant to cover all funded non-pension benefits-
its drafters were mistaken.
On top of these defects, the ERISA drafters made a mess of their attempt
to incorporate Taft-Hartley Act benefits. The Taft-Hartley Act exempts
contributions to certain types of union-established employee benefit trusts
from its ban on employer payments to labor organizations, including trusts to
provide child care centers. ERISA adopted a corresponding reference to "day
care centers," which has led the Labor Department to conclude that the
welfare plan definition comprehends child care benefits only when the
employer provides child care in kind (on-premises day care facilities, for
example), not when the company provides financial assistance for employee-
arranged child care.' 43 Similarly, the welfare plan definition catches
"scholarship finds" but misses unfunded employer promises to provide
education benefits.'44
DIVERSION OF UNION WELFARE-PENSION FUNDS OF ALLIED TRADES COUNCIL AND TEAMSTERS
LOCAL 815, S. REP. NO. 1348, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); Diversion of Union Welfare-Pension
Funds of Allied Trades Council and Teamsters Local 815: Hearings Before the Permanent
Investigations Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
142. See supra Part II.A. The fiduciary responsibility provisions (part 4, title 1) contain an
exception for unfunded executive deferred compensation plans, ERISA § 
4 0 1(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
1 101(a)(1) (1994) (discussed infra Part II.D), but not for unfunded welfare plans nor unfunded pension
plans generally.
143. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 93-25A (Sep. 13, 1993), available in 1993 ERISA LEXIS 26
(indicating a program to reimburse dependent care expenses is exempt where caregivers are selected
by participants); ERISA Op. Ltr. 91-25A (July 2, 1991), available in 1991 ERISA LEXIS 25; ERISA
Op. Ltr. 88-IOA (Aug. 12, 1988), available in 1988 ERISA LEXIS 10. Such dependent care assistance
programs allow employees to direct a portion of their wages or salary to be withheld and used for
reimbursing eligible expenses on a tax-free basis if the requirements of I.R.C. § 129 (1994) are
satisfied.
144. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(k) (1997) (indicating unfunded scholarship programs are exempt).
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3. Other Benefits
While it is possible that ERISA's drafters meant to cover all important
employee benefits, clearly they did not. The pension and welfare plan
definitions fail to reach several types of compensation that can be significant
to workers' career and financial planning, such as the decision whether to
accept or continue employment, or the determination of the necessary
amount of household saving. Or, from a paternalistic perspective, the statute
fails to cover a number of benefits that can induce substantial reliance. In-
service deferred compensation is among the most glaring omissions.'45 But
employer financial assistance that is targeted to child care or college costs is
also usually exempt, and until recently help with the costs of home
ownership was too. Because such arrangements escape classification as
pension or welfare plans, federal preemption does not apply. Consequently,
this third category of employee benefits, while exempt from federal
oversight, is a permissible subject of state and local regulation.
4. Policy Considerations
The benefits beyond ERISA's reach do not make a major contribution to
total compensation costs. But even though items such as employer financial
assistance for child care or college costs are not significant in the aggregate,
where they are available they can be extremely important to individual
participants. Child care and college costs are after all among the largest
household expenditures. And in-service deferred compensation, which can be
used to save for any purpose-including saving for college or the purchase of
a home-is also unregulated. 146 Such programs present a prospect of ill-
informed decisionmaking and defeated expectations that is at least as great as
the risk posed by many of the benefit arrangements to which ERISA
expressly applies. (Accidental death and dismemberment insurance, for
example, or group legal service plans.) The exclusion of such programs thus
seems anomalous in view of the objectives of federal benefit regulation-the
importance of information to efficiently functioning labor and capital
145. This observation applies only to plans that mandate in-service distribution after a relatively
brief period of deferral. Plans that permit workers to delay distribution are likely, as a result of
surrounding circumstances (such as the preferential tax treatment of qualified plans or employer
encouragement), to lead to deferral to the termination of employment, thereby triggering pension
classification. And even plans that require in-service distribution could be pension plans if the
distributions are delayed so long that they occur late in an employee's career, shortly before
retirement. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.




markets, the potential for fiduciary misconduct, and the need to prevent
unwarranted reliance (paternalism) are all implicated. Nevertheless, the
continued omission of such benefits from even the limited oversight applied
to welfare plans may be justified by the need to preserve employer flexibility
and contain costs. Congress remains committed to a voluntary employee
benefits system and does not want to stifle innovative compensation
arrangements-additional items can be added to the list of welfare benefits
when experience shows that conduct controls are needed.
147
Turning now to the benefits that are subject to federal regulation,
ERISA's classification scheme is arguably dysfunctional. Pensions are
subject to much stricter regulation than welfare plans, including minimum
participation and vesting requirements, and, in the case of defined benefit
plans, funding and termination insurance. Congress imposed these minimum
standards for the content of the pension promise because the long-term nature
of the employer's commitment creates serious risk of defeated expectations.
Unlike current compensation, the executory nature of the pension contract
means an employer is not called on to perform its side of the bargain for
many years, and in the interim circumstances may change (e.g., employer
insolvency) to prevent performance, however genuine the company's initial
commitment may have been. This concern is valid with regard to pensions,
but the same risk is present in any form of deferred compensation, whether it
is in-service deferred compensation (which is untouched by federal law) or a
promise of deferred welfare benefits (which is subject only to reporting and
disclosure, fiduciary obligations and federal enforcement). Consider the most
important case, plans providing retiree health care benefits. Because no
vesting requirement applies, employers are generally free to terminate such
programs at any time to stem escalating costs or for other reasons, regardless
of an employee's length of service or level of need. Such results occur
because the welfare plan definition looks only to the type of benefit and pays
no heed to whether it is to be provided on a current or deferred basis. The
objectives of the statute would be better served if, instead of tying the level of
regulation to the purpose for which benefits are provided, vesting and other
appropriate content controls were applied to any plan providing substantial
deferred compensation regardless of form, including retiree health care
coverage and college saving plans. (Of course, existing pension content
147. From this perspective, the mystery of ERISA's welfare plan definition lies in its inclusion of
certain fringe benefits that are infrequently offered and of relatively low cost, such as prepaid legal
services. Such inclusion seems attributable to the drafters' reliance on the Taft-Hartley Act's list of
permissible union-sponsored benefit funds, which was amended in 1973 to include legal service plans.
Act of Aug. 15, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-95, 87 Stat. 997 (1973).
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controls would need to be tailored to the different objective of these
programs 148) The current welfare plan regulatory regime, which oversees the
conduct of the benefit plan but does not affect its content, would then be
applied only to benefit programs that do not entail a substantial element of
deferral (such as current health care or life insurance coverage).
D. Exceptions
A few benefit arrangements that fit the statutory definition of an
employee benefit plan (either pension or welfare) are nevertheless excepted
from most or all of ERISA's requirements. The most important exceptions
are for unfunded executive deferred compensation arrangements (so-called
"top hat" plans), and for plans sponsored by governmental or religious
organizations.
1. Top Hat Plans
Top hat plans are unfunded plans "maintained by an employer primarily
for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of
management or highly compensated employees."' 49 Although they would
otherwise be classified as pension plans (the deferral invariably extends to
the termination of employment or beyond), top hat plans are exempt from all
the minimum standards applied to pension plans, and are even excused from
ERISA's generally applicable fiduciary obligations. 150 Consequently, only
the reporting and disclosure rules, the enforcement mechanism, and
preemption apply.15 1 Of these, the reporting and disclosure obligations of top
hat plans have been relaxed by regulation,152 so ERISA's principal effect on
148. For example, an extended period of service might be an acceptable condition of eligibility or
vesting for retiree health insurance, even though such indenture is prohibited under pension plans. Yet
health care protection for a surviving spouse is as important as is survivor annuity coverage under
pension plans. In contrast, it would seem that in the case of college savings plans, survivor protection
should run in favor of dependent minor children.
149. See ERISA § 201(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1051(2) (1994).
150. Id (accrual, vesting, spousal rights, and antialienation); ERISA § 301(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1081(a)(3) (1994) (funding); ERISA §401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § Ill01(a)(1) 1994) (fiduciary
responsibility); ERISA § 4021(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1994) (plan termination insurance).
151. Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 929-31 (3d Cir. 1985) (limited
application to top hat plans), overruled as to an unrelated point by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993) (arbitrability of ERISA claims).
152. ERISA § 110, 29 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994), permits the Labor Department to prescribe an
alternate method of compliance with the statutory reporting and disclosure obligations for any category
of pension plans that meet certain criteria. Pursuant to that authority, the Labor Department allows an
employer to satisfy its informational obligations by filing a single statement of the number of unfunded




unfunded executive deferred compensation arrangements is to provide a
mechanism for federal judicial enforcement of the terms of the plan, which
(as a result of the ouster of state law) must be interpreted and applied
according to federal common law.
153
This pattern is consistent with ERISA's policies. Congress exempted top
hat plans from ERISA's requirements because high-level executives have the
bargaining power to negotiate particular terms and monitor their interest
under the plan, and therefore do not need substantive protections (the
minimum standards of pension plan content) or fiduciary obligations.
Moreover, employer flexibility is particularly important in the case of
executive compensation arrangements, which must be individually tailored to
attract and retain key personnel. But if bargaining and informal oversight
break down, executives must have access to judicial enforcement to vindicate
their contractual rights, or the plan becomes an illusory promise. 154 Notice
that these considerations apply with equal force to both funded deferred
compensation and welfare plans for top executives, yet the top hat plan
exception is inexplicably limited to unfunded deferred compensation.
The definition of a top hat plan leaves the scope of the exemption unclear.
The plan must be unfimded and "maintained by an employer primarily for
the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of
management or highly compensated employees."' 55 But what does
"primarily" modify? Does it refer to the type of benefits provided ("primarily
... deferred compensation") or to the composition of participants ("primarily
... management or highly compensated employees")? Early decisions and
rulings seemed to follow the latter approach, looking to the percentage of
employees covered by the plan and comparing their average pay with the rest
of the workforce, so that the exemption could apply even if a few rank-and-
file employees were covered by the plan. 156 In 1990, however, the Labor
Department announced its view that "primarily" refers to the benefits
provided under the plan and not to the participant composition, 1 7 so that the
Department on request. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104-23 (1997); see Barrowelough, 752 F.2d at 931-34
(discussing relaxed disclosure requirements).
153. Barrowclough, 752 F.2d at 935-37 (saying the federal enforcement mechanism and federal
common law apply to a claim for breach of the plan's terms); Kemmerer v. ICI Americas, Inc., 70 F.3d
281, 287 (3d Cir.) (saying "breach of contract principles, applied as a matter of federal common law,
govern disputes arising out of [top hat] plan documents," and such plans should be "interpreted in
keeping with the principles that govern unilateral contracts"), cert. denied, 116 U.S. 1826 (1995).
154. Kemmerer, 70 F.3d at 288; Wiedenbeck, supra note 17, at 581.
155. ERISA §§ 201(2), 301(a)(3), 401(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(a)(3), 1101(a)(1) (1994).
156. E.g., Belka v. Rowe Furniture Corp., 571 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1983). See generally,
Vincent Amoroso et al., SERP Sponsors Beware, 24 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 1001 (1997).
157. ERISA Op. Ltr. 90-14A (May 8, 1990), available in 1990 ERISA LEXIS 12.
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exemption may be lost if any participant is not a member of the "select
group." More recent decisions seem to follow this approach, 15 8 which is more
consonant with ERISA's informational and protective policies, although in
mixed membership plans it may "safeguard" executives in ways that they do
not need or want
159
In order to apply a rule that top hat status is lost if any member fails to
qualify as a "management" or "highly compensated employee," those
categories must be specified with precision. Yet the statute leaves both terms
undefined. Some practitioners have assumed that satisfaction of the tax law's
quantitative definition of the term "highly compensated employee" suffices
for top hat status, but that definition serves other purposes.160  The Labor
Department's 1990 opinion seems to take the view that "the ability to affect
or substantially influence, through negotiation or otherwise, the design and
operation of their deferred compensation plan" provides a functional
definition of "management or highly compensated employees," and recent
cases follow that path.16 1 Under this approach many plans that extend
coverage to middle management ranks could be found to violate ERISA's
substantive provisions, even though all participants satisfy the tax law's
definition of highly compensated employee. That may be appropriate in light
of ERISA's protective policy, but the functional approach requires a fact-
intensive inquiry the outcome of which is far less predictable than bright-line
criteria keyed to compensation level.
2. Government Plans
Government and church plans, both pension and welfare, are exempt
from all of ERISA's requirements, including the reporting and disclosure and
federal enforcement provisions. 162 (In addition, government and church
158. E.g., Duggan v. Hobbs, 99 F.3d 307, 312-13 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding an unfunded pension
provided under an individually-negotiated severance agreement was an exempt top hat plan because
the departing employee had sufficient clout to influence the design and operation of the plan); Gallione
v. Flaherty, 70 F.3d 724, 726-28 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding a union plan covering full-time officers, who
were responsible for setting policy and negotiating labor contracts, exempt because its coverage was
limited to the upper-echelon of union management).
159. If the top hat plan exemption is forfeited due to the inclusion of rank-and-file employees,
then ERISA's pension funding and vesting requirements would come into play, which (in the case of a
nonqualified plan) would cause the participants to be taxed in advance of distribution. See I.R.C. §§
402(b), 83(a) (1994).
160. I.R.C. § 414(q) (West Supp. 1996) (the definition of highly compensated employee for
purposes of the coverage and amount nondiscrimination rules).
161. See, e.g., Duggan, 99 F.3d 307; Gallione, 70 F.3d 724. See generally Vincent Amoroso et al.,
supra note 156.
162. An early version of the bill that became ERISA would have applied fiduciary responsibility,
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pension plans are excused from compliance with the tax law counterparts of
ERISA's minimum standards for pension plan content; they must, however,
satisfy pre-ERISA vesting and nondiscrimination rules to be treated as
qualified plans.163) Unlike the top hat plan exceptions, these exclusions are
not conditioned on the plan being unfunded or limited to executives. This is
unsurprising, for the absence of need for regulation was not the primary
justification for excluding government and church plans from coverage.
In the case of government plans, some legislators thought that minimum
vesting standards were less necessary because public sector pension plans
typically contained more liberal vesting requirements than their private sector
counterparts.164 The ability of governmental employers to make good their
pension promises by exercise of their taxing power was considered by some
an adequate substitute for minimum funding and plan termination
insurance. 65 That view, however, was by no means universal; Congress went
so far as to mandate a study of the need for federal regulation of government
plans.166 The decisive factor was apparently political-a concern that the
reporting and disclosure, and federal enforcement provisions to state and local government plans. H.R.
2, 93d Cong. §§ 101(a), 503(e) (as reported by the Education and Labor Committee Oct. 7, 1973);
H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9 (1973).
163. I.R.C. §§ 401(a) (final sentence), 411(e) (accrual and vesting), 410(c) (prohibited age and
service conditions and coverage nondiscrimination), 412(h) (funding and pre-ERISA vesting
requirement), 4975(g) (prohibited transaction excise taxes) (1994). An irrevocable election can be
made to have the tax qualification requirements apply to a church plan with full force. Id. § 4 10(d).
Qualified plan status is primarily relevant to participants in funded government or church plans
because absent qualification they will be taxed on their share of the employer's contributions when
their rights become nonforfeitable, an event which may occur long before the receipt of distributions
from the trust or annuity contract. See id. §§ 402(b), 83(a). Distributions would not be eligible for tax
deferral through rollover to a qualified plan or individual retirement account. Id. § 402(c)(1)(A),
(c)(8)(A). Because governmental and church organizations are tax exempt, suspending the deduction
of contributions to a nonqualified plan (as § 404(a)(5) requires) has no force.
Deferred compensation arrangements that do not satisfy the relaxed qualification requirements for
government plans may nonetheless receive special tax treatment (deferral of taxation until distribution)
if they meet the standards set out in § 457, but that alternative is unavailable to churches and church-
controlled organizations. Id. § 457(e)(13).
164. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 43 (1973) (additional views of Rep. Erlenborn).
165. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 91, 165 (1974) ("It has been argued that governmental plans should
be exempt from the funding standards since the taxing power can be viewed as a practical substitute
for these standards."); S. REP. No. 93-383, 81 (1973) (saying the tax power is also an adequate
substitute for plan termination insurance).
166. ERISA § 3031, 29 U.S.C. § 1231 (1994); H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 91, 165 (1974)
(proposing a study of governmental plans because the Ways and Means Committee was "concerned
with reports that in the case of a number of governmental units, such generous pension promises have
been made and so little funds have been set aside currently, that the practical likelihood of imposing
sufficient taxes to pay those benefits may be open to question."); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 43-44
(1973) (additional views of Rep. Erlenborn). The resulting study concluded that "[tjhe absence of a
coherent and uniform regulatory framework [for governmental plans] has resulted in generally
ineffective communication of basic plan provisions, inadequate safeguarding of plan assets and
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imposition of the new standards "might entail unacceptable cost implications
to governmental entities."'167 Or, from a more high-minded perspective, the
governmental plan exception is founded on principles of federalism, in the
sense of comity or non-interference, as opposed to constitutional
imperative.
168
A governmental plan is defined generally as a plan that is "established or
maintained for its employees by the Government of the United States, by the
government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or by any agency or
instrumentality of any of the foregoing."1 69 The concept of an agency or
instrumentality of a state or political subdivision is broad, but not limitless.
The tax law's definition of qualified deferred compensation plans contains
corresponding exceptions for government and church plans, and the IRS has
ruled that a volunteer fire company providing fire protection services by
contract with local municipalities was not an agency or instrumentality of the
government where the company was under the exclusive control of a board
of trustees elected by the volunteer firefighters, was not affiliated with the
state under any specific legislation, and was financed by community
donations and contract fees rather than tax revenue. 170 The Service
announced a multifactor test that emphasizes the extent of public control over
the organization's operations:
A plan will not be considered a governmental plan merely because
the sponsoring organization has a relationship with a governmental
unit or some quasi-governmental power. One of the most important
factors to be considered in determining whether an organization is an
agency or instrumentality of the United States or any state or political
subdivision is the degree of control that the federal or state
government has over the organization's everyday operations. Other
factors include: (1) whether there is specific legislation creating the
organization; (2) the source of funds for the organization; (3) the
manner in which the organizations trustees or operating board are
insufficient protection of participants' interests." HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, 95TH
CONG., 2D SESS., PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 3
(Comm. Print 1978).
167. H.R. REP. NO:93-807, at 165 (1974).
168. Rose v. Long Island 1KR. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1987); see H.R. REP. NO.
93-533 at 9 (1973).
169. ERISA § 3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994).
170. Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117. The Code's definition of a governmental plan is identical
to ERISA's except that it requires the plan to be "established and maintained" by a governmental
organization rather than "established or maintained." Compare I.R.C. § 414(d) (1994), with ERISA §
3(32), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(32) (1994). This unexplained and apparently inadvertent discrepancy is




selected; and (4) whether the applicable governmental unit considers
the employees of the organization to be employees of the applicable
governmental unit. Although all of the above factors are considered in
determining whether an organization is an agency of a government,
the mere satisfaction of one or all of the factors is not necessarily
determinative.
1 71
Although the Department of Labor has not adopted this test as an
interpretation of ERISA's definition of a governmental plan, it appears to
follow a similar approach.
172
While the test focuses on operational control over the plan sponsor, day-
to-day operational control over the plan is not required. A plan can be
"established or maintained" by a unit of government for its employees
without being governmentally administered-a health care plan for state
employees is a government plan even though benefits are provided via
contractual arrangements with one or more health maintenance
organizations, for example. 173  Similarly, welfare and pension plans
established by collective bargaining between a governmental unit and a
union representing public employees are treated as established or maintained
by the government even if they are administered by a board that is not
controlled by the public employer, the exemption is not limited to plans
created by the unilateral action of a governmental body. 174
171. Rev. Rul. 89-49, 1989-1 C.B. 117. Contrast Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9414007 (Dec. 16, 1993), which
applied the same standards to find that a volunteer fire protection district created under specific state
legislation was an instrumentality of state government where the bulk of its revenues was received
from property taxes and three of the seven members of the district's board of trustees were elected by
property owners or appointed by public officials.
172. See, e.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 86-06A (Feb. 3, 1986), available in 1986 ERISA LEXIS 20
(indicating the City of Milwaukee Firemen's Relief Association's death benefit plan is a governmental
plan because the association was established by state statute and municipal charter, its membership is
limited to current and former public employees, and the plan is subsidized by the city).
173. Silvera v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 884 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1989); Simac v. Health
Alliance Med. Plans, Inc., 961 F. Supp 216 (C.D. Ill. 1997). Limiting the governmental plan
exemption to cases of direct public administration of employee benefit plans would violate the
principle of economic neutrality for no apparent purpose. Private employers cannot escape ERISA by
contracting out the provision of benefits. See 29 C.F.R § 2510.3-10) (1997) (saying employers may
establish or maintain a benefit plan by paying premiums to provide coverage under group insurance
arrangements selected by the employees).
174. ERISA Op. Ltr. 79-36A (June 11, 1979), available in 1979 ERISA LEXIS 56 (equal
numbers of employer and union trustees); ERISA Op. Ltr. 86-22A (Sept. 9, 1986), available in 1986
ERISA LEXIS 7 (governmental plan even if administered solely by union representatives).
19981
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3. Church Plans
ERISA also exempts church plans, apparently out of concern for
separation of church and state. The exception precludes First Amendment
challenges based on entangling government regulation. ERISA
accommodates the complex institutional structure of some churches by
including as a church any related tax-exempt organization (trust or
corporation). That organization need not have a primary religious purpose,
however, so the church plan definition is astonishingly expansive. As
amended in 1980, it goes far beyond exempting plans covering religious
personnel or church employees, exempting plans covering employees of
religiously-affiliated charitable organizations such as hospitals, schools, and
group homes. 175 An employee of a tax-exempt organization is treated as the
employee of a church and his employer is deemed to be a church if the
organization is "controlled by or associated with a church or a convention or
association of churches,"'176 and sharing "common religious bonds and
convictions with the church" is sufficient to show association.
177
Accordingly, benefit plans covering employees of Catholic hospitals or
parochial schools (for instance) may be exempt from ERISA, even though
their tax-exempt but non-sectarian counterparts must contend with the full
force of federal regulation.1
78
The church plan definition is expansive in two further respects. First, all
ministers or clergy engaged in religious work are treated as church
employees even if they are technically independent contractors or are
175. The legislative history of the 1980 amendment is quite limited. See 126 CONG. REc. 20,180
(1980) (Sen. Javits remarks that exemption of church-related institutions was an undesirable but
necessary political trade-off); id. at 20,208 (joint explanation of Senate bill, in the nature of a
committee report); id. at 20,245 (clarifying remarks of Senators Talmadge and Long).
176. ERISA § 3(33)(C)(ii)(I), (33)(C)(iii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(ii)(II), (33)(C)(iii) (1994);
I.R.C. § 414(e)(3)(B)(ii), (e)(3)(C) (1994).
177. ERISA § 3(33)(C)(iv), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (1994); I.RC. § 414(e)(3)(D) (1994).
178. See, e.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 86-03A (Jan. 13, 1986), available in 1986 ERISA LEXIS 25 (plan
covering Catholic school employees); ERISA Op. Ltr. 94-1IA (Mar. 23, 1994), available in 1994
ERISA LEXIS 14 (plan covering employees of Mennonite hospital). Where the plan is set up by the
church-related charity for its employees, the expansive definitions of "church" and "church employee"
seem to assure that the plan is "established and maintained" by a (deemed) church for its employees.
But church control or influence (direct or indirect) over the board or committee that administers the
plan also satisfies the definition. ERISA § 3(33)(C)(i), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(i) (1994); I.R.C. §
414(e)(3)(A) (1994). Some rulings explicitly treat the latter requirement as an alternative means of
satisfying the church plan definition. E.g., ERISA Op. Ltr. 95-IOA (June 16, 1995), available in 1995
ERISA LEXIS 13 (plans for employees of Jesuit university). However, rulings under the
corresponding tax law definition seem to suggest that church control over plan administration may be
an additional, independent requirement. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9411045 (Dec. 22, 1993) (Catholic hospital




actually employed by another institution (e.g., army, prison or hospital
chaplains, or teachers of religious studies at an unrelated university).179
Second, a retroactive correction mechanism is provided for plans that fail to
meet the exemption criteria. 80
III. CONCLUSION
The scope of federal benefit regulation is remarkably broad-it can reach
an oral promise made to a single employee. Yet ERISA's coverage also has
some significant limitations. Some of those limitations are consistent with the
statute's objectives; others are quite anomalous.
It takes a "plan" to trigger the statute. The goal of preventing
mismanagement and abuse requires the oversight of discretionary
decisionmaking, and so the courts have rightly concluded that the presence of
discretion is sufficient to justify finding a plan exists. Stringent fiduciary
obligations were also meant to apply to anyone who handles benefit funds,
and so advance funding should be enough to find a plan, even absent
discretion. In contrast, an unfunded nondiscretionary benefit obligation does
not require fiduciary oversight, but in that case another statutory goal may
justify imposing ERISA regulations. ERISA promotes economic efficiency
by providing workers with the information they need to make better career
and financial planning decisions. Where disclosure of the principal features
of an ongoing benefit commitment would facilitate planning, that alone
should be enough to find a plan.
Uncertainty as to the amount of benefits or the identity of beneficiaries
has also led some courts to hold that no enforceable plan exists. Often that is
the right result. But ERISA was intended to protect employees' reasonable
expectations, so if the employer's acts create a reasonable expectation of
benefits, that expectation should be enforced notwithstanding documents or
practices that purport to give the employer uncontrolled discretion over who
will benefit or in what amount.
ERISA was enacted to inform and protect employees. An "employee"
must participate in a benefit program for the law to apply, which the
Supreme Court construes to mean common law employee. But where
business owners are covered under the same program as their common law
employees, it is unsettled whether the owners' rights against insurers or third
party administrators are controlled by federal or state law.
179. ERISA § 3(33)(CXiiXI), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(ii)(1) (1994); I.R.C. § 414(e)(3)(B)(i)
(1994); 126 CONG. REC. 20,245 (remarks of Sen. Long).
180. ERISA § 3(33)(D), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(D) (1994); I.RC. § 414(e)(4) (1994).
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The applicability and intensity of federal regulation is also keyed to the
nature of the program's benefits; only plans providing employees with
"welfare" or "pension" benefits are covered. ERISA's goals would be best
served by classifying deferred compensation of any sort as a pension benefit,
with benefits provided currently designated as welfare benefits if they are
important enough to warrant federal oversight. The history of political and
legal attention to employee benefits, however, produced the less functional
categories by which ERISA now operates. Pension controls come into play
only if compensation is deferred to the termination of employment, welfare
plans may offer substantial deferred compensation without concern for
vesting or funding, and some important fringe benefits, including employer
financial assistance with child care or college costs, are exempt from ERISA.
Three important exceptions from ERISA are also surprising in the light of
the legislative objectives. Unfunded executive deferred compensation
arrangements must use ERISA's enforcement mechanism, but are otherwise
exempt from all federal and state regulation. Top managers clearly have
access to information and the power to protect themselves, but why limit this
exception to unfunded deferred compensation? Top executives hardly need
fiduciary protections when they grant themselves special life insurance or
health care coverage, or negotiate a special trust fund for their retirement. In
addition, government and church plans, both pension and welfare, are
entirely excluded from ERISA, regardless of the employees' need for
information or protection. Although the legal rationales and political
expediency of those exclusions are clear, many workers are left without
protection, and in some industries ERISA's coverage is quite erratic. For
example, both state and church-affiliated institutions of higher education are
exempt, while private nonsectarian colleges and universities must toe the
line.
Any comprehensive new statute is bound to contain some mistakes and
political compromises. ERISA has its share. This analysis has shown that
ERISA's coverage, while not capricious, is in several instances quite curious.
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